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Abstract
We investigate the endogenous choice of strategic variable (a price or a quantity) by downstream
firms in a two-tier industry in which an upstream firm performs the R&D investment. We show
that when the upstream firm offers either linear discriminatory or uniform input price, it is a domi-
nant strategy for each downstream firm to choose Bertrand competition when two products become
relatively differentiated. Second, from the viewpoint of downstream firms, we show that Bertrand
competition is more efficient than Cournot competition in some boundaries of Cournot equilibrium,
which implies that each downstream firm faces a prisoners’ dilemma under the Cournot equilib-
rium. However, when the downstream firms involve in centralized bargaining with an upstream
firm to determine the two-part tariff discriminatory (uniform) input pricing contracts, we find that
choosing price (quantity) contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms. In this case, we
further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market
competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot).
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1 Introduction
It is well known that Bertrand and Cournot competition are two classical models in the theory of
oligopoly. What are the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on profit and welfare? In
a seminal work, Singh and Vives (1984) show that both firms earn higher profits under Cournot
than under Bertrand competition, while social welfare is higher under Bertrand than under Cournot
competition. Also, they show that adopting quantity (price) contract is a dominant strategy for both
firms if the goods are substitutes (complements). However, it has received little attention to the
endogenous choice of strategic variable, either price or quantity, in a vertically related market. Hence,
we revisit the endogenous choice of strategic variable, either price or quantity, in a vertically related
market in which an upstream monopolist undertakes cost reducing R&D investment.
An anecdotal evidence of our analysis is as follows. Most commonly, an upstream firm sells its
product to downstream firms, who then sell it to consumers. In such a market, R&D investment by the
upstream firm inevitably affects the profits of the downstream firms. The upstream firm undertakes
investments in R&D, which leads to low input prices for the downstream firms. For example, over the
last 40 years, Intel, which provides CPUs for many computer companies, has exploited opportunities in
CPUs with a prime concern. Pursuing maximal profits for each new generation of CPUs was always a
key priority, with goals of minimizing costs and reducing prices. Intels CEO, Paul Otellini, announced
that R&D investment was a blueprint for Intel to maintain its technology leadership and competitive
advantage.
The work by Singh and Vives (1984) has been extended in two separate streams. One stream
focuses on comparisons of the profits and social welfare in Bertrand and Cournot Equilibrium. The
other stream focuses on the endogenous choice of strategic variable, either price or quantity. The
first framework that focuses on extensions and generalizations of their study, for example, Dastidar
(1997), Lambertini (1997), Hackner (2000), Amir and Jin (2001), and Zanchettin (2006), shows the
counter-results of the first stream by allowing for cost and demand asymmetry.1 Qiu (1997) shows that
Cournot competition yields a higher level of cost-reducing investment than Bertrand. He also shows
that Cournot competition is more efficient than Bertrand when products are close substitutes, high
investment efficiency and large investment spillover.2 For a vertically related market, there are Correa-
Lopez and Naylor (2004), Arya et al. (2008), Mukherjee et al. (2012), Alpranti et al. (2014), and
Lee and Choi (2015), among others. They also compare Bertrand with Cournot by introducing cost
1Cheng (1985) and Vives (1985) generalize these results, respectively, by explaining a graphical description and by
considering the n-firm oligopolistic case. Okuguchi (1987) points out the sensitivity of the results in Singh and Vives
(1984). Dastidar (1997) shows that Bertrand equilibrium prices may not be lower than Cournot equilibrium price under
the equal sharing rule with asymmetric costs.
2Symeonidis (2003) finds that quality is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand, and that output,
consumer surplus and social welfare are higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand if R&D spillovers are
large and products are not too differentiated. See also Lin and Saggi (2002), Breton et al. (2004) and Hinloopen and
Vandekerckhove (2009).
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reducing R&D investment, unionized market, technological differences, and two-part tariff contracts,
and so on.
Correa-Lopez and Naylor (2004) shows that Bertrand profits may exceed Cournot profits when
decentralized bargaining over labor cost is introduced. Arya et al. (2008) examine how the standard
conclusions about Bertrand and Cournot competition can alter when the production of a key input is
outsourced to a vertically integrated retail competitor. They show that Bertrand competition leads to
higher prices, higher industry profits, lower consumer surplus, and lower total surplus than Cournot
competition. Mukherjee et al. (2012) compare Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical
structure. They show that downstream firms’ profits depend on the technological differences between
downstream firms. Alipranti et al. (2014) compare Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical
structure in which the upstream firm bargains with each downstream firm via two-part tariff contracts.
Alipranti et al. (2014) show that Cournot competition yields higher output (or lower price), consumers’
surplus, and total welfare than Bertrand competition. Lee and Choi (2015) compare Bertrand with
Cournot competition in a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolist invests in cost
reducing R&D. They show, from the viewpoint of downstream firms, a trade-off between monopolistic
(i.e., less competitive) effect and lower wholesale price effect induced by upstream investment. They
investigate that Bertrand profit is higher than Cournot profit when the first effect is overwhelmed by
the second effect.
Another stream addresses the endogenous choice of strategic variable. During the past 30 years,
there exist a few papers examining the counter-results of the endogenous choice of strategic variable,
either price or quantity contract. The framework that focuses on the endogenous choice of strategic
variable, for example, Correa-Lopez (2007), Basak and Wang (2016), Choi (2012), and Matsumura
and Ogawa (2012), reveal the counter-results of the second stream. Correa-Lopez (2007) shows that
it may be a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the price competition, when both products
are sufficiently substitutive and the wage is the result of decentralized firm-union bargain. Basak and
Wang (2016) also consider the endogenous choice of strategic variable in a vertically related market
in which an upstream firm proposes two-part tariff contracts to its downstream firms. They find that
it may be a dominant strategy for each downstream firm to choose Bertrand competition when the
input price is determined by the result of Nash bargaining contract. On the other hand, Choi (2012)
and Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) show the counter-results of the conventional wisdom in a mixed
duopoly.
Our paper also shows the counter-results of the conventional wisdom about the endogenous choice
of strategic variable. Our result is in stark contrast with the existing literature. Even though the
above mentioned papers hold the same result with Singh and Vives (1984), these papers analyze
the endogenous choice of strategic variable in different environment and game, for example, Nash
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bargaining game and mixed duopolistic environment. However, we follow the Singh and Vives’s
traditional approach.
Our paper investigates the endogenous choice of strategic variable, either price or quantity, in a
vertical related market in which an upstream monopolist undertakes cost reducing R&D investments.
We show, from the standpoint of downstream firms when the upstream firm offers either linear dis-
criminatory or uniform input price, that they are confronted by a trade-off between monopolistic
effect (i.e., less competitive effect) and lower input price effect. Hence, it is a dominant strategy for
each downstream firm to choose price competition when the first effect is overwhelmed by the sec-
ond effect. Second, from the standpoint of downstream firms when the upstream firm offers either
linear discriminatory or uniform input price, even though Bertrand competition is more efficient than
Cournot competition, both downstream firms will choose Cournot competition in some boundaries
(i.e., prisoner’s dilemma). However, when the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining with
an upstream firm to determine the two-part tariff discriminatory (uniform) input pricing contracts,
we find that choosing price (quantity) contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms. In this
case, we further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product
market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. Section
3 examines three games (Cournot, Bertrand, and Asymmetry Game). In Section 4, we present our
main results. In Section 5, we give some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the basic notation and common elements of the models to be examined
in the remainder of the paper. Consider an economy with two differentiated final goods producers,
downstream firms D1 and D2. These firms require a critical input, which is produced by upstream
firm U . We assume that the representative consumers utility is a quadratic function given by
CU = a(qi + qj)−
q2i + q
2
j + 2dqiqj
2
+m; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
where qi denotes the output of downstream firm i(i = 1, 2) and m is the numeraire good. Parameters
a is positive constant and d ∈ (0, 1) represents the degree of product differentiation:3 a smaller d
indicates a larger degree of product differentiation. Hence, consumers’ inverse and direct demands for
Di’s final good are:
pi = a− qi − dqj and qi = a(1− d)− pi + dpj
1− d2 ; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (1)
3See Singh and Vives (1984) for details regarding the derivation of the demand functions from the representative
consumer’s utility maximization problem
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where pi is Di’s price.
The marginal cost for the upstream firm is max[0, c−x], where c is the initial marginal cost and x
is the cost reduction undertaken as a result of investment by the upstream firm. To simplify, assume
that the investment cost is given by vx
2
2 , where the parameter v > 0 relates to investment efficiency.
Thus, we assume that the upstream firm produces one input and sells it at one price. For simplicity,
one unit of the final product needs exactly one unit of the input and the cost of transforming the input
into the final product is normalized to zero.
We posit a four-stage game. In the first stage, each downstream firm simultaneously and indepen-
dently chooses the type of the binding contract to offer consumers. There are two possible types of
contract: the quantity contract and the price contract. In the second stage, the upstream firm sets
the investment level (x). In the third stage, the upstream firm sets the input price (w). Finally, in
the fourth stage, two downstream firms make its optimal level of their strategic variable contingent
on the type of contract committed at stage one.
3 Equilibrium Outcomes under Linear Uniform Input Pricing
We solve a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium through backward induction.
3.1 Cournot Competition with Linear Uniform Input Pricing
At stage four, downstream firm Di chooses qi in order to maximize its profits for given the input price
w, and the rival’s quantity qj . The downstream firm Di’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
qi
pii(w, qi, qj) = (pi − w)qi = (a− qi − dqj − w)qi.
The resulting reaction functions are
qi(w, qj) =
a− w − dqi
2
. (2)
Note that the decrease in the input price charged to Di shifts out its reaction function and turns
it into a more aggressive downstream competitor. Solving the reaction functions (2), we obtain the
quantities in terms of the input price w as follows:
qi(w) =
a− w
2 + d
.
At stage three, it is straightforward to derive the equilibrium payoff for the upstream firm and the
upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
w
Π(x,w) = (w − c0)(qi + qj)− vx
2
2
=
2(a− w)(w − c+ x)
2 + d
− vx
2
2
,
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where c0 = c− x. The equilibrium input price for the upstream firm is as follows:
w(x) =
a+ c0
2
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firms maximization problem is as follows:
max
x
Π(x) = (w − c0)(qi + qj)− vx
2
2
=
(a− c0)2
2(2 + d)
− vx
2
2
.
If v > a(2+d)c , the equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
xC =
a− c
(2 + d)v − 1 , (3)
where the superscript “C” denotes Cournot competition. Note that the second-order condition is
v > 12+d for Cournot competition.
We obtain the equilibrium input price (wC), quantities (qCi = q
C
j ), prices (p
C
i = p
C
j ), upstream
firm’s profit ΠC , and downstream firms’ profit (piCi = pi
C
j ):
wC = c+
(a− c)[(2 + d)v − 2]
2[(2 + d)v − 1] , q
C
i =
(a− c)v
2[(2 + d)v − 1] , (4)
pCi = c+
(a− c)[(3 + d)v − 2]
2[(2 + d)v − 1] , Π
C =
(a− c)2v
2[(2 + d)v − 1] , pi
C
i =
(a− c)2v2
4[(2 + d)v − 1]2 , (5)
CSC =
(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[(2 + d)v − 1]2 , SW
C =
(a− c)2v[(7 + 3d)v − 2]
4[(2 + d)v − 1]2 . (6)
3.2 Bertrand Competition with Linear Uniform Input Pricing
We next turn to Bertrand competition in which each downstream firm sets a price. At stage four,
downstream firm Di chooses pi in order to maximize its profits for given the input price w, and the
rival’s price pj . The downstream firm Di’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pi
pii(w, pi, pj) = (pi − w)qi = (pi − w)[a(1− d)− pi + dpj ]
1− d2 .
The resulting reaction function is
pi(w, pj) =
a(1− d) + w + dpj
2
. (7)
Note that a decrease in the input price charged to Di shifts in its reaction function and turns it into a
more aggressive competitor. Solving (7), we obtain the equilibrium prices in terms of the input price:
pi(w) =
a(1− d) + w
2− d .
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At stage three, the upstream firm sets the input price (w), so as to maximize its profit for the
given investment level (x). The upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
w
Π(x,w) = (w − c0)(qi + qj)− vx
2
2
=
2(a− w)(w − c0)
2 + d− d2 −
vx2
2
.
The equilibrium input price is as follows:
w =
a+ c0
2
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
x
Π(x) =
(a− c0)2
2(2 + d− d2) −
vx2
2
.
If v > a
(2+d−d2)c , the equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
xB =
a− c
(2 + d− d2)v − 1 , (8)
where the superscript “B” denotes Bertrand competition. Note that the second-order condition is
v > 1
2+d−d2 for Bertrand competition. We obtain the equilibrium input price, quantities, prices,
upstream firms profit, and downstream firms profit under Bertrand competition:
wB = c+
(a− c)[(2 + d− d2)v − 2]
2[(2 + d− d2)v − 1] , q
B
i =
(a− c)v
2[(2 + d− d2)v − 1] , (9)
pBi = c+
(a− c)[(1 + d)(3− 2d)v − 2]
2[(2 + d− d2)v − 1] , Π
B =
(a− c)2v
2[(2 + d− d2)v − 1] , pi
B
i =
(1− d2)(a− c)2v2
4[(2 + d− d2)v − 1]2 ,
(10)
CSB =
(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[(2 + d− d2)v − 1]2 , SW
B =
(a− c)2v[(1 + d)(7− 4d)v − 1]
4[(2 + d− d2)v − 1]2 . (11)
3.3 Asymmetric Competition with Linear Uniform Input Pricing
We now turn to the asymmetric case in which downstream firm i sets a price, while downstream firm
j sets a quantity. At stage four, downstream firm i sets a price pi so as to maximize its profit for a
given rival’s quantity qj , investment level (x), and input price (w). Downstream firm i’s maximization
problem is as follows:
max
pi
pii(w, pi, qj) = (pi − w)qi = (pi − w)(a− pi − dqj).
The resulting reaction function is
pi(w, qj) =
a+ w − dqj
2
. (12)
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On the other hand, downstream firm j chooses qj so as to maximize its profit for given rival’s price
pi, and input price w. Downstream firm j’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
qj
pii(w, pi, qj) = (pj − w)qj = [a(1− d)− w + dpi − (1− d2)qj ]qj .
The resulting reaction function is
qj(w, pi) =
a(1− d)− w + dpi
2(1− d2) . (13)
Solving Eq. (12) and (13), we obtain the equilibrium price pi and the equilibrium quantity qj as a
function of input prices w as follows:
pi(w) =
a(2− d− d2) + (2 + d− 2d2)w
4− 3d2 , qj(w) =
(2− d)(a− w)
4− 3d2 .
At stage three, the upstream firm sets the input price w, so as to maximize its profit for given
investment level x. The upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
w
Π(x,w) = (w − c0)(qi + qj)− vx
2
2
=
(w − c0)(4− 2d− d2)(a− w)
4− 3d2 −
vx2
2
.
The equilibrium input price is derived as follows:
w =
a+ c0
2
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level x, so as to maximize its profit. The
downstream firms maximization problem is as follows:
max
x
Π(x) = (w − c0)(qi + qj)− vx
2
2
=
(4− 2d− d2)(a− c0)2
4(4− 3d2) −
vx2
2
.
If v > (4−2d−d
2)a
2(4−3d2)c , the equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
xP = xQ =
(4− 2d− d2)(a− c)
2(4− 3d2)v − (4− 2d− d2) , (14)
where the superscripts “P” and “Q” denote the price-setting downstream firm and the quantity-
setting downstream firm in the asymmetric competition mode, respectively. Note that the second-
order condition is v > (4−2d−d
2)
2(4−3d2) for the asymmetric competition. Thus, we obtain the equilibrium
input price (wP = wQ), quantities (qPi , q
Q
j ), prices (p
P
i , p
Q
j ), upstream firm’s profit (Π
Q = ΠP ), and
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the downstream firms’ profit (piPi , pi
Q
j ).
qPi =
(1− d)(2 + d)(a− c)v
(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2) , q
Q
j =
(2− d)(a− c)v
(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2) , (15)
pPi = c+
(a− c)[(6− d− 4d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)]
(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2) , (16)
pQj = c+
(a− c)[(6− d− 5d2 + d3)v − (4− 2d− d2)]
(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2) , (17)
piPi =
(1− d)2(2 + d)2(a− c)2v2
[(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)]2 , pi
Q
j =
(1− d2)(2− d)2(a− c)2v2
[(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)]2 , (18)
wQ = wP = c+
(a− c)[v(4− 3d2)− (4− 2d− d2)]
(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2) , (19)
ΠQ = ΠP =
(4− 2d− d2)(a− c)2v
2[(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)] , CS
P = CSQ =
(a− c)2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v2
2[(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)]2 (20)
SWP = SWQ =
(a− c)2v[(4− 3d2)(14 + 8d+ 3d2)− v(4− 2d− d2)2]
2[(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)]2 (21)
3.4 Endogenous Choice of Contract with Linear Uniform Input Pricing
In the previous section, we analyzed Cournot, Bertrand, and asymmetric equilibria. In this section,
we examine the endogenous choice of the strategic variable. For simplicity, we set the following
assumptions in order to guarantee that all possible variables are positive in equilibrium. Specifically,
this assumption takes the following form4:
v ≥ a
(1 + d)c
≡ va, (A1)
It will be shown below that (A1) guarantees positive, post-investment costs of production in Bertrand,
Cournot and asymmetric competition.
Comparing the prices among Bertrand, Cournot, and asymmetric case, we obtained the following
result5:
pBi < p
P
i < p
Q
i < p
C
i and q
C
i < q
Q
i < q
P
i < q
B
i ,
when d ∈ (0, 1). Hence, we summarize this result in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The price (quantity) under Cournot competition is always higher (smaller) than that un-
der Bertrand competition.
4For general discussion in terms of assumption, see Section 5 for the investment level of upstream firm.
5pQi − pPi = (a−c)(1−d)d
2v
2(4−3d2)v−(4−2d−d2) > 0, p
P
i − pBi = (a−c)(1−d)d
2v[4(1+d)v−1]
2[(2+d)v−1][(2(4−3d2)v−(4−2d−d2)] > 0, and p
C
i − pQi =
(a−c)d2v[2(2−d2)v−1+d]
2[(2+d)v−1][2(4−3d2)v−(4−2d−d2)] > 0.
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From the standpoint of downstream firms, Lemma 1 means that each downstream firm has an incentive
to choose Cournot competition other things being equal.
However, comparing the R&D investment level among all competition modes, we obtained the
following result6:
xC < xA < xB,
when d ∈ (0, 1). Hence, we summarize this result in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The R&D investment level under Bertrand competition is always larger than that under
Cournot competition.
Noting Eq. (4), Eq. (8), and Eq. (12), downstream firm has an incentive to choose Bertrand
competition other things being equal. Therefore, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is obvious that each
downstream firm faces on a trade-off between monopolistic power and investment incentive.
The pay-off matrix for the price-quantity game is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Payoff Matrix for Downstream Firms
Firm i\Firm j Quantity Price
Quantity piCi , pi
C
j pi
Q
i , pi
P
j
Price piPi , pi
Q
j pi
B
i , pi
B
j
To understand the endogenous choice of the strategic variable, it is useful to compare the payoffs
described above. Comparing piCi with pi
P
i , we obtain the following results:
piCi − piPi =
1
4
(a− c)2v2
{
1
[(2 + d)v − 1]2 −
4(2− d− d2)2
[(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)]2
}
.
Applying the above equation to a discriminant, we obtain two roots v† ≡ 12d and v∗ ≡ 8−4d−3d
2
2(8−6d2−d3) .
Note that assumption (A1) guarantees va > v∗. Thus, the inequality that piCi − piPi > 0 holds when
v > 12d .
Similarly, comparing piBi with pi
Q
i , we obtain the following results:
piBi − piQi =
1
4
(a− c)2v2
{
1− d2
[(2 + d− d2)v − 1]2 −
4(2− d)2(1− d2)
[(8− 6d2)v − (4− 2d− d2)]2
}
.
Through the same calculation process, we also obtain two roots v† ≡ 12d and v∗∗ ≡ 8−4d−d
2
2(8−6d2+d3) . Note
that assumption (A1) guarantees va > v∗∗. Thus, the inequality that piBi −piQi > 0 holds when v < 12d .
Figure 1 illustrates critical values, v† and va in the (v, d) space.
6xBi − xAi = (a−c)d
2(2−d−d2)v
[(2−d)(1+d)v−1][2(4−3d2)v−(4−2d−d2)] > 0, and x
A
i − xCi = (a−c)(2−d)d
2v
2[(2+d)v−1][2(4−3d2)v−(4−2d−d2)] > 0.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Area for Strategic Variables
(v∗ ≡ 8−4d−3d2
2(8−6d2−d3) , v
∗∗ ≡ 8−4d−d2
2(8−6d2+d3) , v
a ≡ a(1+d)c from (A1) when ac = 1)
If v < 12d , each downstream firm chooses Bertrand competition and each downstream firm chooses
Cournot competition if v > 12d . In region of critical values, if v < (>)
1
2d with assumption (A1) above
va line, it is a dominant strategy for the downstream firm to choose Bertrand (Cournot) competition.
We summarize these findings in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Under (A1), if v < 12d , each downstream firm chooses Bertrand competition.
Proposition 1 suggests that it is a dominant strategy for each downstream firm to choose Bertrand
competition as products become more differentiated and the investment efficiency parameter v becomes
smaller, and vice versa. The profit effect for each downstream firm can be decomposed into two oppos-
ing effects. One is an investment incentive effect. The other is a monopolistic effect. The monopolistic
effect refers to the fact that, according to Lemma 1, downstream firms may prefer to choose Cournot
instead of Bertrand competition, since Cournot competition yields higher prices and lower output
than Bertrand. The investment incentive effect has to do with the fact that, according to Lemma 2,
the upstream supplier invests more in R&D under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. The
latter translates into lower per unit of input price under Bertrand than under Cournot competition,
or in other words, the downstream firms face lower marginal cost under Bertrand competition. As
a consequence, they may prefer to choose Bertrand instead of Cournot competition. Therefore, our
results come from a trade-off between investment incentive and monopolistic effect. As the products
become more differentiated (i.e, d is sufficiently small), the difference between the investment levels in
R&D under Bertrand and Cournot competition decreases, and thus the “investment incentive effect
becomes weaker.
The intuitive explanation behind Proposition 1 may lie on two effects: The first effect is related to
11
the fact that as the products become closer substitutes the market competition becomes fiercer, and
thus firms prefer to choose Cournot than Bertrand competition, since the former mode of competition
is less competitive than the latter. The second effect is related to the fact that the upstream undertakes
higher investments in R&D under Bertrand than under Cournot competition, that translates into lower
wholesale prices for the downstream firms under Bertrand than under Cournot competition, and thus
firms may prefer to choose Bertrand instead of Cournot competition. When the products are not
close substitutes, the first effect is relatively weak and thus the second effect dominates, therefore
firms choose price competition. When the products become closer substitutes, the first effect becomes
stronger, the second effect becomes weaker, and thus the first effect dominates. Therefore, firms
choose quantity competition. Even though this paper produces the similar result as Correa-Lopez
(2007) and in Basak and Wang (2016), our result is in stark contrast with the existing literature.
They demonstrate the endogenous choice of Bertrand equilibrium in a bargaining model, while we
demonstrate it in a non-cooperative game with upstream firm’s investment.
Finally, on the basis of the result of Lee and Choi (2015), we discuss the Bertrand-Cournot welfare
comparison.
CSB > CSC and SWB > SWC
if (A1) and v ≥ 2(3+d−d2)
12+10d−5d2−3d3 are satisfied.
7 Note that v ≥ 2(3+d−d2)
12+10d−5d2−3d3 is guaranteed by (A1).
This result is correspond to Singh and Vives’s (1984) result that Bertrand competition is more efficient
than Cournot competition from the standpoint of consumer surplus and social surplus.
We now focus on downstream firms’ profits. It is also important to examine whether Bertrand and
Cournot equilibrium are efficient or not. From Lee and Choi (2015), we obtain the following results.
Lemma 3: Under (A1), each downstream firm’s profit under Bertrand competition is higher than
under Cournot competition, if va < v < 1+d+
√
1−d2
2d(1−d) .
This result has already been shown in Lee and Choi (2015) under (A1).8 From Proposition 1,
Lemma 3 and Figure 2, we have the following proposition.
7For detail, see Lee and Choi (2015).
8For detail, see Lee and Choi (2015).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Area and Comparisons
(v† ≡ 12d , v‡ ≡ 1+d+
√
1−d2
2d(1−d) , v
a ≡ a(1+d)c from (A1) when ac = 2)
Proposition 2: Under (A1), Cournot equilibrium under 12d < v <
1+d+
√
1−d2
2d(1+d) is a prisoner’s dilemma
from the viewpoint of downstream firms.
Let us see Figure 2. Region A (Region C) means that it is a dominant strategy for both downstream
firms to choose Bertrand (Cournot) competition. However, in region B, both downstream firms choose
Cournot competition endogenously. Note that piCi < pi
B
i in region B. Therefore, each downstream firm
faces a prisoners’ dilemma in region B and then the equilibrium is a Pareto inferior. This is because
piQi > pi
B
i > pi
C
i > pi
P
i when v
†(≡ 12d) < v < v‡.
4 Equilibrium Outcomes with Linear Discriminatory Input Pricing
Up to now, we consider the model with discriminatory input price between upstream and downstream
firms including linear pricing contract. Here, suppose that the upstream firm offers discriminatory
input price in the sense that it is able to adopt an optimal ex post input price that could be different
(hence “discriminatory”) between the two downstream firms; i.e. the input price is conditional on the
realized investment by upstream firm. Let w1 and w2 be the discriminatory input price.
4.1 Cournot Competition with Linear Discriminatory Input Pricing
Using previous sections with uniform input price, downstream firm’s profit motive yields maxqi p¯i
C
i =
(pi−wi)qi = (a− qi− dqj −wi)qi. Thus, solving these two reaction functions simultaneously in fourth
stage is given by q¯i =
a(2−d)−2wi+dwj
4−d2 . Given this, Di’s the profit reduces to p¯i
C
i = (q¯
C
i )
2. At stage
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three, the upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
Π¯C =
2(2− d)[c0(wi + wj)− a(2c0 − wi − wj)]− 4(w2i − dwiwj + w2j )− (4− d2)vx2
2(4− d2) ,
Solving these two reaction functions yields the equilibrium per-unit discriminatory input price as
w¯Ci =
a+ c0
2
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit: max Π¯x =
a−c0−2vx−dvx
2+d , which implies that the first-order condition for the upstream firm’s maximization prob-
lem is given by
x¯C =
a− c
(2 + d)v − 1 , (22)
Note that if v > a(2+d)c ≡ vD, the equilibrium investment is derived. Thus, we obtain the equilibrium
outcomes with Cournot competition under linear discriminatory input pricing as follows:
q¯Ci = q
C
i , w¯
C
i = w
C , p¯Ci = p
C
i , Π¯
C = ΠC , p¯iCi = pi
C
i C¯S
C
= CSC , ¯SW
C
= SWC .
4.2 Bertrand Competition with Linear Discriminatory Input Pricing
As in Bertrand competition with uniform input pricing, repeating same process with wi and wj . At
stage four, downstream firm Di chooses pi in order to maximize its profits for given the input price
wi, and the rival’s price pj . The downstream firm Di’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pi
p¯ii = (pi − wi)qi = (pi − wi)[a(1− d)− pi + dpj ]
1− d2 .
Solving the first order conditions we obtain the equilibrium output of the ith firm p¯i =
a(2−d−d2)+dwi+2wj
4−d2 .
At stage three, the upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
wi
Π¯B =
(2− d2)w2i − a(2− d− d2)(2c0 − wi − wj) + 2dwiwj − (2− d2)w2j + c0(2− d− d2)(wi + wj)
4− 5d2 + d4 −
vx2
2
,
Solving these two reaction functions yields the equilibrium per-unit discriminatory input price as
w¯Bi =
a+c0
2 .
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firms maximization problem is as follows: maxx Π¯
B = (a−c0)
2
2(2−d)(1+d) − vx
2
2 , which implies that
the equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
x¯B =
a− c
(2− d)(1 + d)v − 1 . (23)
Hence, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes with Bertrand competition under linear discriminatory
input pricing as follows:
q¯Bi = q
B
i , w¯
B
i = w
B, p¯Bi = p
B
i , Π¯
B = ΠB, p¯iBi = pi
B
i , C¯S
B
= CSB, ¯SW
B
= SWB.
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4.3 Asymmetric Competition with Linear Discriminatory Input Pricing
We now turn to the asymmetric case in which downstream firm i sets a price, while downstream firm
j sets a quantity. At stage four, downstream firm i sets a price pi so as to maximize its profit for a
given rival’s quantity qj , investment level (x), and discriminatory input price (wi). Downstream firm
i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pi
p¯ii = (pi − wi)qi = (pi − wi)(a− pi − dqj).
max
qj
p¯ij = (pj − wj)qj = [a(1− d)− wj + dpi − (1− d2)qj ]qj .
Repeating same process in uniform input price and solving two reaction functions yield
p¯i =
a− dqj + wi
2
, q¯j =
a(1− d) + dpi + wj
2(1− d2) .
At stage three, it is straightforward to derive the equilibrium payoff for the upstream firm and the
upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
wi
Π¯P =
(wj − c0)[a(2− d) + dwi − 2wj ]
4− 3d2 +
(wi − c0)[a(2− d− d2)− wi(2− d2) + dwj ]
4− 3d2 −
vx2
2
,
max
wj
Π¯Q =
(wj − c0)[a(2− d) + dwi − 2wj ]
4− 3d2 +
(wi − c0)[a(2− d− d2)− wi(2− d2) + dwj ]
4− 3d2 −
vx2
2
.
Solving these two reaction functions yields the equilibrium per-unit discriminatory input price as
w¯Pi = w¯
Q
i =
a+ c0
2
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
x
Π¯ =
1
4
[
(a− c0)2(4− 2d− d2)
4− 3d2 − 2vx
2
]
,
which implies that the equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
x¯P = x¯Q =
(4− 2d− d2)(a− c)
2(4− 3d2)v − (4− 2d− d2) . (24)
Thus, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under discriminatory input pricing that are the same with
linear uniform input priceing.
qPi = q¯
P
i , q
Q
j = q¯
Q
j , p
P
i = p¯
P
i , p
Q
j = p¯
Q
j , pi
P
i = p¯i
P
i , pi
Q
i = p¯i
Q
i , w
Q = wP = w¯Qi = w¯
P
i ,
Π¯Q = ΠQ = ΠP = Π¯P , CSP = CSQ = C¯S
Q
= C¯S
P
, SWP = SWQ = ¯SW
Q
= ¯SW
P
.
Finally, by comparing linear input pricing contract between uniform and discriminatory input
prices yield the following proposition.
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Proposition 3: Regardless of the nature of goods, all equilibrium outcomes can obtain the same equi-
librium between linear uniform and discriminatory input pricing. Thus, the same properties can obtain
with Propositions 1 and 2 under linear discriminatory input pricing.
5 Two-part Tariff Contract with Bargaining and Discriminatory In-
put Pricing
In the previous subsections, we have derived equilibria associated with absence in bargaining between
upstream and downstream firm. We now compare the effectiveness in terms of the bargaining power
impact under varying degrees of investment efficiency, v. In what follows, we will analyze the model
with bargaining between upstream and downstream firms including two-part tariff contract. Borrowing
Basak and Wang (2016), we extend to to revisit the classic question of price and quantity contract
where the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining with an upstream firm to determine the
two-part tariff contracts with discriminatory input pricing.
At stage 1, each downstream firm simultaneously chooses whether to adopt quantity contract or
price contract. At stage 2, the upstream firm sets the investment level (x). At stage 3, the upstream
firm is involved in a centralised bargaining with a representative of D1 and D2 to determine the terms
of the two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed fee, fi, i = 1, 2, and a per-unit discriminatory
input price, wi. At stage 4, firms compete contingent to the decisions made in stage 1.
We work out the equilibrium outcomes under each of these strategy combinations. We assume that
upstream firm bargains with a representative of D1 and D2 to determine the terms of the two-part
tariff contracts involving fixed fee, fi, and a per-unit discriminatory input price, wi.
At stage 3, the upstream firm, the monopoly upstream firm and a representative of D1 and D2
determine the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing the following generalized Nash
bargaining expression:
max
fki ,w
k
i
{ 2∑
i=1
[(wki − ck0)qki + fki −
v(xk)2
2
]
}β{ 2∑
i=1
(piki − fki )
}1−β
, (25)
Maximizing Eq. (25) with respect to fi gives the following
fki =
1
2
{
β
2∑
i=1
[
piki −
v(xk)2
2
]
− (1− β)
[ 2∑
i=1
qki (w
k
i − c0)
]
+
v(xk)2
2
}
. (26)
Substituting (27) in (26), we get the maximization problem as
max
wki
{
β
[ 2∑
i=1
piki + q
k
i (w
k
i − c0)−
v(xk)2
2
]
+
v(xk)2
2
}β{
(1− β)
[ 2∑
i=1
[piki + q
k
i (w
k
i − c0)]−
v(xk)2
2
]}1−β
.
(27)
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Using the envelope theorem, Eq. (27) shows that the per-unit discriminatory input price is determined
to maximize the industry profit (i.e., the total profits of Π, D1 and D2), since the profit of a monopoly
final goods producer, producing both the products at max[0, c− x] marginal cost of production.
5.1 Cournot Competition with Discriminatory Input Price
Using previous Sections with uniform input price, downstream firm’s profit motive yields maxqi pˆi
C
i =
(pi −wi)qi − fi = (a− qi − dqj −wi)qi − fi. Thus, solving these two reaction functions simultaneously
in fourth stage is given by qˆCi =
a(2−d)−2wi+dwj
4−d2 . Given this, Di’s the profit reduces to pˆi
C
i = (qˆ
C
i )
2−fi.
At stage three, maximizing Eq. (27) subject to qˆCi =
a(2−d)−2wi+dwj
4−d2 and pˆi
C
i with solving these two
reaction functions give the equilibrium per-unit discriminatory input price and fixed fee as
wˆCi = c0 +
a− c0
2(1 + d)
, fˆCi =
1
4
[
(1− β)v(xC)2 − (a− c0)
2[β − d(1− β)]
(1 + d)2
]
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firms maximization problem is given by maxx Πˆ
C = 12
[ (a−c0)2
1+d − vx2
]
. Thus, if v > a(1+d)c ,
the equilibrium investment is derived as follows
xˆC =
a− c
(1 + d)v − 1 , (28)
Using Eq. (28), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under Cournot competition under two-part tariff
contract with discriminatory input price as follows:
qˆCi =
(a− c)v
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , wˆ
C
i = c+
(a− c)(dv − 2)
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , pˆ
C
i = c+
(a− c)[v(1 + d)− 2]
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , (29)
fˆCi =
(a− c)2v[1− dv + β(v(1 + d)− 1)]
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 , pˆi
C
i =
(a− c)2(1− β)v
4[(1 + d)v − 1] , (30)
CˆS
C
=
(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 ,
ˆSW
C
=
3(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 . (31)
5.2 Bertrand Competition with Discriminatory Input Pricing
We next turn to Bertrand competition in which each downstream firm sets a price. At stage four,
downstream firm Di chooses pi in order to maximize its profits for given the input price wi, and the
rival’s price pj . The downstream firm Di’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pi
pˆii = (pi − wi)qi − fi = (pi − wi)[a(1− d)− pi + dpj ]
1− d2 − fi.
Similar to previous subsection, equilibrium price in fourth stage is given by pˆi =
a(2−d−d2)+dwi+2wj
4−d2 .
Given this, Di’s the profit reduces to pˆi
B
i = (qˆ
B
i )
2 − fi where qˆBi = a(2−d−d
2)+dwi−(2−d2)wj
4−5d2+d4 . At stage
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three, maximizing Eq. (27) subject to pˆBi =
a(2−d−d2)+dwi+2wj
4−d2 and pˆi
B
i = (qˆ
B
i )
2− fi with solving these
two reaction functions gives the equilibrium per-unit discriminatory input price and fixed fee as
wˆBi = c0 +
(a− c0)d
2
, fˆBi =
(a− c0)2(β − d) + (1 + d)(1− β)vx2
4(1 + d)
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firm’s maximization problem is given by the upstream firm’s profit function. Thus, the
equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
xˆB =
a− c
(1 + d)v − 1 = xˆ
C . (32)
Using Eq. (32), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under Bertrand competition as follows:
qˆBi = qˆ
C
i , wˆ
B
i = wˆ
C
i , pˆ
B
i = pˆ
C
i , pˆi
B
i = pˆi
C
i , CˆS
B
= CˆS
C
, ˆSW
B
= ˆSW
C
.
fˆBi =
(a− c)2v[1− β − (1 + d)(d− β)v]
4[v + dv − 1]2 .
5.3 Asymmetric Competition with Discriminatory Input Pricing
We now turn to the asymmetric case in which downstream firm i sets a price, while downstream firm
j sets a quantity. At stage four, downstream firm i sets a price pi so as to maximize its profit for a
given rival’s quantity qj , investment level (x), and discriminatory input price (wi). Downstream firm
i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pi
pˆii = (pi − wi)qi − fi = (pi − wi)(a− pi − dqj)− fi,
max
qj
pˆij = (pj − wj)qj − fj = [a(1− d)− wj + dpi − (1− d2)qj ]qj − fj .
Repeating same process in uniform input price and solving two reaction functions yield
pˆi =
(1− d)[a(2 + d) + 2(1 + d)wi − dwj ]
4− 3d2 , qˆj =
a(2− d) + dwi − 2wj
4− 3d2 . (33)
At stage three, maximizing Eq. (27) subject to Eq. (33) gives the equilibrium per-unit discriminatory
input price and upfront fixed fee as
wˆPi = c0 +
(a− c0)d
2(1 + d)
, wˆQj = c0 +
(a− c0)d
2
,
fˆPi = fˆ
Q
j =
(a− c0)2[2(1 + d)β − d(2 + d)]
8(1 + d)2
+
(1− β)vx2
4
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firms maximization problem is given by the upstream firm’s profit. Thus, the equilibrium
investment is derived as follows:
xˆP = xˆQ = xˆB = xˆC . (34)
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Using Eq. (34), we obtain the same equilibrium outcomes regardless of the mode of product market
competition as follows:
qˆPi = qˆ
Q
j = qˆ
C
i = qˆ
B
i , wˆ
Q
j = c+
(a− c)(dv − 2)
2[v(1 + d)− 1] , wˆ
P
i = c+
(a− c)[dv(1 + d)− 2]
2[v(1 + d)− 1] , (35)
pˆPi = pˆ
Q
j = c+
(a− c)[v(1 + d)− 2]
2[v(1 + d)− 1] , (36)
fˆPi = fˆ
Q
j =
(a− c)2v[(2− 2d− d2)v + 2β(v + dv − 1)]
8[v(1 + d)− 1]2 , (37)
pˆiPi =
(a− c)2v[2β − 2 + 2v + 2dv + d2v − 2βv − 2dβv]
8[v(1 + d)− 1]2 , (38)
pˆiQj =
(a− c)2v[2β − 2 + 2v + 2dv − d2v − 2βv − 2dβv]
8[v(1 + d)− 1]2 , (39)
CSP = CSQ =
(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[v(1 + d)− 1]2 , SW
P = SWQ =
3(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[v(1 + d)− 1]2 . (40)
5.4 Endogenous Choice of Contract with Bargaining and Discriminatory Input
Pricing
In the previous section, we analyzed Cournot, Bertrand, and asymmetric equilibria under two-part
tariff contract with bargaining. In this section, we examine the endogenous choice of the strategic
variable with bargaining and discriminatory input price.
To understand the endogenous choice of the strategic variable, it is useful to compare the payoffs
described above. Noting that assumption (A1) guarantees va > vD, comparing pˆiCi (pˆi
B
i ) with pˆi
P
i (pˆi
Q
i )
yields the following results:
pˆiCi − pˆiPi =
−(a− c)2d2v2
8[v(1 + d)− 1]2 < 0, pˆi
B
i − pˆiQi =
(a− c)2d2v2
8[v(1 + d)− 1]2 > 0.
Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 4: Suppose that the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining with an up-
stream firm to determine the two-part tariff vertical discriminatory pricing contracts, Then, under
(A1), choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-part-tariff
pricing contract is determined through centralized Nash bargaining. Furthermore, the level of social
welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot
or asymmetric competition).
6 Two-part Tariff Contract with Bargaining and Uniform Input
Pricing
Up to now, we will analyze the model with bargaining and uniform input price, w between upstream
and downstream firms including two-part tariff contract.
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At stage 1, each downstream firm simultaneously chooses whether to adopt quantity contract or
price contract. At stage 2, the upstream firm sets the investment level (x). At stage 3, the upstream
firm is involved in a centralised bargaining with a representative of D1 and D2 to determine the terms
of the two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed fee, fi, i = 1, 2, and a per-unit uniform
input price, w. At stage 4, firms compete contingent to the decisions made in stage 1.
We work out the equilibrium outcomes under each of these strategy combinations. We assume that
upstream firm bargains with a representative of D1 and D2 to determine the terms of the two-part
tariff contracts involving fixed fee, fi, and a per-unit uniform input price, w.
At stage 3, the upstream firm, the monopoly upstream firm and a representative of D1 and D2
determine the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing the following generalized Nash
bargaining expression:
max
fki ,w
k
{ 2∑
i=1
[(wk − ck0)qki + fki −
v(xk)2
2
]
}β{ 2∑
i=1
(piki − fki )
}1−β
, (41)
where ck0 = c − xk, k denotes C,B,Q and P in contract and β ∈ (0, 1) (resp. (1 − β)) shows the
bargaining power of the downstream (resp. upstream) firm. Maximizing Eq. (41) with respect to fi
gives the following
fki =
1
2
{
β
2∑
i=1
[
piki −
v(xk)2
2
]
− (1− β)
[ 2∑
i=1
qki (w
k − c0)
]
+
v(xk)2
2
}
. (42)
Substituting (42) in (41), we get the maximization problem as
max
wk
{
β
[ 2∑
i=1
piki + q
k
i (w
k − c0)− v(x
k)2
2
]
+
v(xk)2
2
}β{
(1− β)
[ 2∑
i=1
[piki + q
k
i (w
k − c0)]− v(x
k)2
2
]}1−β
.
(43)
Eq. (43) shows that the per-unit uniform input price is determined to maximize the industry profit
(i.e., the total profits of Π, D1 and D2), since the profit of a monopoly final goods producer, producing
both the products at max[0, c− x] marginal cost of production.
6.1 Cournot Competition with Uniform Input Price
Similar to Basak and Wang (2016) and using previous sections with liner contract, downstream firm’s
profit motive yields maxqi pi
C
i = (pi − w)qi − fi = (a− qi − dqj − w)qi − fi. Thus, similar equilibrium
output in fourth stage is given by q¯Ci =
a−w
2+d . Given this, Di’s the profit reduces to pi
C
i = (q
C
i )
2−fi. At
stage three, maximizing Eq. (43) subject to q¯Ci =
a−w
2+d and p¯i
C
i gives the equilibrium per-unit uniform
input price and fixed fee as
w¯C = c0 +
(a− c0)d
2(1 + d)
, f¯Ci =
1
4
[
(1− β)v(xC)2 − (a− c0)
2[β − d(1− β)]
(1 + d)2
]
.
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At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firm’s maximization problem is given by Π¯C = (wC − c+ xC)(qCi + qCj )− v(x
C)2
2 . Thus, the
equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
x¯C =
a− c
(1 + d)v − 1 , (44)
Using Eq. (44), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under Cournot competition as follows:
q¯Ci =
(a− c)v
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , w¯
C = c+
(a− c)(2− dv)
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , p¯
C
i = c+
(a− c)[(1 + d)v − 2]
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , (45)
f¯Ci =
(a− c)2v[1− dv − β(1− v(1 + d))]
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 , p¯i
C
i =
(a− c)2(1− β)v
4[(1 + d)v − 1] , (46)
C¯SC =
(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 ,
¯SWC =
(a− c)v[(3 + d)v − 2β(1− v(1 + d))]
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 . (47)
6.2 Bertrand Competition with Uniform Input Price
We next turn to Bertrand competition in which each downstream firm sets a price. At stage four,
downstream firm Di chooses pi in order to maximize its profits for given the input price w, and the
rival’s price pj . The downstream firm Di’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pi
pii = (pi − w)qi − fi = (pi − w)[a(1− d)− pi + dpj ]
1− d2 − fi.
Thus, similar to previous subsection, equilibrium price in fourth stage is given by p¯i =
a(1−d)+w
2−d . Given
this, Di’s the profit reduces to p¯i
B
i =
(1−d)(a−w)2
(2−d)2(1+d) − fi. At stage three, maximizing Eq. (43) subject to
p¯i =
a(1−d)+w
2−d and p¯i
B
i =
(1−d)(a−w)2
(2−d)2(1+d) − fi gives the equilibrium per-unit uniform input price and fixed
fee as
w¯B = c0 +
(a− c0)d
2
, f¯Bi =
(a− c0)2(β − d) + (1 + d)(1− β)vx2
4(1 + d)
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firm’s maximization problem is given by the upstream firm’s profit function. Thus, the
equilibrium investment is derived as follows:
x¯B =
a− c
(1 + d)v − 1 = x¯
C . (48)
Using Eq. (48), we obtain the equilibrium outcomes under Bertrand competition as follows:
q¯Bi =
(a− c)v
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , w¯
B = c+
(a− c)[(1 + d)vd− 2]
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , p¯
B
i = c+
(a− c)[v(1− d)− 2]
2[(1 + d)v − 1] , (49)
f¯Bi =
(a− c)2v[1− dv − β + vβ(1 + d)]
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 , p¯i
B
i =
(a− c)2(1− β)v
4[(1 + d)v − 1] , (50)
C¯SB =
(a− c)2(1 + d)v2
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 ,
¯SWB =
(a− c)v[(3 + d)v − 2β(1− v(1 + d))]
4[(1 + d)v − 1]2 . (51)
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6.3 Asymmetric Competition with Uniform Input Price
We now turn to the asymmetric case in which downstream firm i sets a price, while downstream firm
j sets a quantity. At stage four, downstream firm i sets a price pi so as to maximize its profit for a
given rival’s quantity qj , investment level (x), and input price (w). Downstream firm i’s maximization
problem is as follows:
max
pi
pii = (pi − w)qi − fi = (pi − w)(a− pi − dqj)− fi.
The resulting reaction function is
pi =
a+ w − dqj
2
. (52)
On the other hand, downstream firm j chooses qj so as to maximize its profit for given rival’s price
pi. Downstream firm j’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
qj
pij = (pj − w)qj − fj = [a(1− d)− w + dpi − (1− d2)qj ]qj − fj .
Solving best response functions, we obtain the equilibrium price pi and the equilibrium quantity qj as
follows:
p¯i =
(1− d)[a(2− d− d2)− (2 + d+ 2d2)w]
4− 3d2 , q¯j =
(a− w)(2− d)
4− 3d2 . (53)
At stage three, maximizing Eq. (43) subject to Eq. (53) gives the equilibrium per-unit input price
and upfront fixed fee as
w¯P = w¯Q =
(a− c0)(2− d− d2)(4− 2d− d2)
16− 20d2 + 6d4 ,
f¯Pi = f¯
Q
j =
1
8
{
(a− c0)2(4− 2d− d2)2(2− d)(d− β)
(2− d2)2(4− 3d2) + 2(1− β)vx
2
}
.
At stage two, the upstream firm sets its investment level (x) so as to maximize its profit. The
upstream firms maximization problem is given by the upstream firm’s profit. Thus, the equilibrium
investment is derived as follows:
x¯P = x¯Q =
(a− c)(4− 2d− d2)2
2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2 . (54)
Using Eq. (54), we obtain the same equilibrium outcomes regardless of the mode of product market
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competition as follows:
q¯Pi =
(a− c)(2− d− d2)(4− 2d− d2)v
2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2 , q¯
Q
j =
(a− c)(8− 8d+ d3)v
2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2 (55)
w¯Q = w¯P = c+
(a− c)[(4− 2d− d2)2 − (2− d)d(4− 3d2)v]
2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2 , (56)
f¯Pi = f¯
Q
j =
(a− c)2v(4− 2d− d2)2v{(4− 2d− d2)(1− β)− 2(4− 3d2)[2d− d(1− β)− 2β]v}
4[2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2]2 , (57)
p¯iPi =
(a− c)2(4− 2d− d2)2vA
4[2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2]2 , p¯i
Q
j =
(a− c)2(4− 2d− d2)2vB
4[2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2]2 (58)
where A = (4− 2d− d2)2(1− β) + 2{8(1− β)− d2[10(1− β)− 2d+ 5d2(5− 3β)]}v (59)
B = (4− 2d− d2)2(1− β) + 2{8(1− β)− d2[10(1− β) + 2d− d2(1 + 3β)]}v (60)
C¯SP = C¯SQ =
(a− c)2v2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)(4− 2d− d2)2
2[2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2]2 , (61)
¯SWP = ¯SWQ =
(a− c)2(4− 2d− d2)2v[(4− 2d− d2)2β + (4− 3d2)(6 + 4β + 4d+ d2 + 2d3β)v]
2[(4− 2d− d2)2 − 2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v]2 .
(62)
6.4 Endogenous Choice of Contract with Bargaining and Uniform Input Pricing
In the previous section, we analyzed Cournot, Bertrand, and asymmetric equilibria under two-part
tariff contract with bargaining. In this section, we examine the endogenous choice of the strategic
variable.
To understand the endogenous choice of the strategic variable, it is useful to compare the payoffs
described above. Comparing p¯iCi (p¯i
B
i ) with p¯i
P
i (p¯i
Q
i ), we obtain the following results:
p¯iCi − p¯iPi =
1
4
(a− c)2v2
{
1− β
(1 + d)v − 1 −
(4− 2d− d2)2vA
4[2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2]2
}
,
p¯iBi − p¯iQi =
1
4
(a− c)2v2
{
1− β
(1 + d)v − 1 −
(4− 2d− d2)2vB
4[2(8− 10d2 + 3d4)v − (4− 2d− d2)2]2
}
.
Applying the above equation to a discriminant, we obtain one root
vb ≡ (4− 2d− d
2)2(4 + d− dβ)
2(32 + 8d− 40d2 − 10d3 + 10d4 + 5d5 − 8dβ + 10d3β − 3d5β) .
Thus, given that β ∈ (0, 1) is constant, the inequalities that p¯iCi > p¯iPi and p¯iQi > p¯iBi hold when v > vb
and vice versa. However, assumption (A1) guarantees va > vb. Thus, the inequalities that p¯iCi > p¯i
P
i
and p¯iQi > p¯i
B
i hold always even when v < v
b since its condition of v < vb violates assumption (A1).
Figure 3 illustrates critical values, vb and vB in the (v, d) space.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Area for Strategic Variables
(vb ≡ (4−2d−d2)2(4+d−dβ)
2(32+8d−40d2−10d3+10d4+5d5−8dβ+10d3β−3d5β) from (A1) when
a
c = 1)
Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 5: Suppose that the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining with an upstream
firm to determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts, Then, under (A2) and (A3), choosing
quantity contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the two-part-tariff pricing con-
tract is determined through centralized Nash bargaining. Furthermore, the level of social welfare is the
same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate the endogenous choice of strategic variable (a price or a quantity) by
downstream firms in a two-tier industry in which an upstream firm performs the R&D investment.
Suppose each downstream firm can choose either a price competition or a quantity competition.
We show, from the viewpoint of each downstream firm when the upstream firm offers either linear
discriminatory or uniform input price, that the price competition has the advantage of providing
a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest, but has the disadvantage of inducing a weaker
monopolistic power. On the other hand, the quantity competition has the advantage of allowing a
stronger monopolistic power, but has the disadvantage of weakening the incentive for the upstream firm
to invest. Our main claim is that, from the viewpoint of each downstream firm when the upstream firm
offers either linear discriminatory or uniform input price, it is a dominant strategy for each downstream
firm to choose Bertrand competition when two products become relatively differentiated. The other
is, in equilibrium, that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. However,
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when the downstream firms involve in centralized bargaining with an upstream firm to determine the
two-part tariff discriminatory (uniform) input pricing contracts, we find that choosing price (quantity)
contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms. In this case, we further show that the level
of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or
Cournot). This result contrasts with the findings of Singh and Vives (1984), in whose research it is
the dominant strategy for each firm to choose a quantity contract.
We conclude by discussing the limitations of our paper. We have used a simple linear demand
structure and a single upstream firm. It is worth to consider our results in the nonlinear demand
structure and in the bilateral duopoly structure. It is also interesting to consider whether our results
are maintained or not under uncertainty. The extension of our model in these directions is left for
future research.
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